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Evolutionary Learning: The Significance for Business
Organisation and Strategy
Introduction
The purpose of this working paper is to provide a bridge between the literatures
of evolutionary and organisational learning (Astley and Van de Van, 1983;
Shrivastava, 1983; Huber, 1991; Easterby-Smith, 1997). Although there are
substantial parallels between the two literatures, as yet there is no adequate
account of evolutionary aspects of organisational learning. This paper is divided
into two sections, the first section examines various aspects of the evolutionary
outlook. It includes a sketch of important concepts relevant to evolutionary
learning (summarised in Table 1), it also outlines the application of these
concepts in the literature on the evolution of organisations. The second section
examines specific processes of evolutionary learning in organisations. The section
begins with a summary of important concepts in evolutionary learning (Table
2). A discussion of applications of these concepts follows.
At its root, processes of evolutionary learning are concerned with the adaptation
of populations of entities in dynamic environments, where the environment
both impacts on and is impacted by the entities. In essence, entities are
attempting to appropriate resources or ‘earn a living’ in their environment. The
domain of corporate strategy shares many of these features. Given an
environment of rapid technological change and intense competition, firms
continuously seek sustainable sources of competitive advantage: core
competences and dynamic capabilities. The ability to learn and adapt is a key
feature in this quest, how can these faculties be built into organisational
processes and behaviour? The answer that they must be built into organisational
routines and architectures (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter, 2000) is not convincing:
they are equally capable of stifling the development of the new. In fact a paradox
exists. In a dynamic enviro n m e n t , adaptive capabilities are prized. However, the
market-selection process tends to favour organisations whose structures
(strategies) are difficult to change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The routines
required to produce something reliably, tend to lead to structural and strategic
inertia, as the construction of routines to achieve this leads to an increase in the
complexity of the patterns of links between organisational sub-units (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984; Levinthal, 1991b). As organisations seek better
environment-structure congruence, their systems become increasingly specialised
and interlinked, making changes to their activities costly and difficult. Adopting
a populational unit of analysis, evolutionary learning can be considered to stem
as much from the birth and death of companies, as it does from adaptation
within companies. This possibility focuses the mind on the extent to which
learning is driven by forces external to the organisation and how far internal
mechanisms can be created that enable self adaptation to take place.
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The Evolutionary Outlook
This section begins with Table 1 setting out the main evolutionary concepts that
feature in the literature on evolutionary approach to organisations. More
detailed discussion of the concepts in an organisational context follow.
Concept 
Evolution
Ecological View
Environmental
Selection
Carrying
Capacity
Darwinism 
Definition 
The gradual process of  change from one
form to another, as in the evolution of the
universe from its formation to its present
state, or in the evolution of life on Earth. In
biology, it is the process which life has
developed by stages from single-celled
organisms into the multiplicity of animal
and plant life.
Seeing the environment in terms of an
interaction between organisms, or groups of
organisms (species), that compete for
resources.
Selection of the fittest by the environment.
The maximum number of animals of a
given species that a particular area can
support. When the carrying capacity is
exceeded, there is insufficient food (or other
resources) for the members of the
population. The population may then be
reduced by emigration, reproductive failure,
disease or starvation.
Chance variation and natural selection are
the roots of Darwin’s evolutionary theory.
Darwin’s theory of natural evolution by
selection asserts that variation in the
survival and fertility of organisms in their
environment gradually leads to the
evolution of species and the diversity of life
forms. Neo-Darwinian theory has the
following premises:
Selected References
Baum and Singh, 1994
Hannan and Freeman,
1977; and Carroll,
1988
Hannan and Freeman,
1977; and Carroll,
1988
For cases of no
competition:
Hannan and Carroll,
1992
McKelvy, 1982;
McKelvy and Aldrich,
1983; Hannan and
Carroll, 1992; Hannan
and Freeman, 1989
Table 1: General Concepts of Evolution
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Concept 
Darwinism 
(continued)
Lamarkian
View
Mendel 
Definition 
◆ Variation: there are variations in the
morphological, physiological and
behavioural characteristics of
organisms.
◆ Heredity: Characteristics are
partially inherited, so that on average
offspring resemble their parents –
more than they resemble unrelated
organisms.
◆ Proliferation: Organisms multiply
and reproduce. Their population will
explode unless checked by
limitations.
◆ Natural Selection: some
characteristics are more favourable to
living than others, and organisms
possessing them will produce more
offspring.
Lamark is associated with the idea that
characteristics acquired during the lifetime of
an individual can be inherited. He observed
that animals changed under environmental
pressure, and (incorrectly) believed that they
could pass on such changes to their offspring. 
Darwin’s concept of chance variations is based
on the assumption of heredity. Darwin
assumed that the biological characteristics of
the children are a blend of those of the
parents, with both parents contributing in
almost equal parts. This meant that offspring
of a parent with a useful, fit chance variation,
has only a 50% chance of inheriting the new
characteristic, and a 25% chance of passing it
on to the next. Thus rapid dilution takes
place. Darwin recognised this as a serious flaw
in his theory.
The gap was filled by Mendel who deduced
that the units of heredity, genes, did not blend
in reproduction, but were transmitted from
generation to generation without changing
their identity. With Mendel’s discovery it
could be assumed that random mutations
would not disappear within a few generations,
but be preserved, to be reinforced or
eliminated by natural selection.
Selected References
Singh, 1990; Singh and
Lumsden, 1990
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Concept 
Density
dependence or
Legitimacy
Founding and
carrying
capacity
Adaptation
Synthesis
Variation
Retention
Definition 
These are factors that regulate the size of a
population under natural circumstances by
acting more severely on a population when it
is large than when it is small. Thus as
numbers increase so does competition for
scarce resources, eg food or nesting material.
Such factors can affect either the birth rate or
the mortality, but the latter is more usual. At
high densities of populations some organisms
have fewer young, or the mortality rate
(brought about by predation, disease or food
shortage) might be higher than at low
densities. The factors tend to cause population
numbers to be maintained at a relatively
constant level over long periods of time.
The birth rate of forms. Death occurs when
the carrying capacity is reached.
Any change in the structure or function of an
organism that allows it to survive and
reproduce more effectively. In the Darwinian
scheme, adaptation is thought to occur as
result of random variation in the genetic
make-up of organisms coupled with natural
selection. Species become extinct when they
are no longer adapted to their environment::
for instance, if the climate suddenly becomes
colder.
The formation of a substance or compound
from more elementary compounds. The
synthesis of a drug can involve several stages
from the initial material to the final product;
the complexity of these stages is a major factor
in the cost of production.
The difference between individuals of the
same species, found in any sexually
reproducing population. Variations may be
almost unnoticeable in some cases, obvious in
others.
Continuation of successful traits until change
becomes necessary.
Selected References
Hannan and Carroll,
1989; Baum and Oliver,
1992
Cyert and March, 1963;
Levitt and March,
1988; Levinthal and
March, 1981; March
1988
Kauffman, 1995; White
et al, 1998
Aldrich, 1979
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Concept 
Crossover
Mutation
Emergent
properties
Fitness
Landscapes
C o - e vo l u t i o n
Phenotype
and Genotype
Definition 
A chromosomal exchange process taking place
during reproduction, which produces
offspring that have gene combinations which
while drawn from their parents, are different
from either of their parents.
A change in genetic makeup of an organism.
It is brought about by a change in the DNA
that makes up the hereditary material of all
living organisms. Mutations, the raw material
of evolution, result from mistakes during
replication (copying) of DNA molecules.
Emergent properties, which are global
properties of the system that the separate parts
do not have. For example, no single neuron
has consciousness, but the human brain does
have consciousness as an emergent property.
Emergence has been described as a surprise
generating mechanism.
Adopting a visual metaphor, evolution can be
considered to consist of a species searching a
‘landscape’ for peaks of high fitness,
corresponding to successful survival and
reproduction. Improvements in a species
fitness arising correspond to a move ‘uphill’ on
their fitness landscape.
Evolution of those structures and behaviours
within a species that can best be understood
in relation to another species. For example,
insects and flowering plants have evolved
together:; insects have produced mouthparts
suitable for collecting pollen or drinking
nectar, and plants have developed chemicals
and flowers that will attract insects to them.
Phenotype describes the observable features
and behaviours of an individual organism and
genotype describes the genetic makeup. The
phenotype results from interaction between
the genotype and the environment in which
development occurs.
Selected References
Strickberger, 1996
Levitt and March, 1988
Belew and Mitchell,
1996; Holland 2000
Wright, 1932; Ahouse,
1990; Bruderer 1993;
and McPherson,1990
Baum and Singh, 1994;
Lumsden, 1990
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Darwinian and Lamarckian Views of Organisational Evolution
The Neo-Darwinist view is that the inertia of existing organisations reaches a
point when change becomes necessary and new members are founded. These
new organisations introduce variation into the pool of competences held by the
population (McKelvy, 1982; McKelvy and Aldrich, 1983). The newly founded
successful organisations are positively selected though their forms exhibiting
higher founding rates or lower failure than existing forms (Alexander and
Amburguey 1987). 
For Darwinists and Neo-Darwinists, natural selection is blind, even through
nature itself is blessed with a degree of self-organisation (White et al, 1997).
Lamark (1809) maintained, incorrectly in biological terms, that characteristics
acquired by an individual during its lifetime could be inherited. However, in
organisational studies Lamarckian inheritance of characteristics or competences
is plausible, because they are stored in one way or another in organisational
memory: routines, architectures, traditions are forms of memory, or at least
means of storing what is learned from the past. Organisations replace less
favoured competences or simply add the new competences to the old ones.
Organic growth or takeovers of other organisations can spread the acquired
characteristics. 
Whereas the dominant approach in organisational ecology (Hannan and Carroll,
1992; Hannan and Freeman, 1989) exemplifies the Darwinian view, the
Lamarckian view (Singh, 1990; Singh and Lumsden, 1990) in which inter-
generational transfer of acquired learning is possible, is best exemplified by
Nelson and Winter (1982) and research on organisational learning by March
(1988). The Schumpeterian view is predominantly Darwinian. One
interpretation of the Darwinian view is that survival of the organisation or the
individual is in a sense irrelevant, at least to the preservation of the species:
indeed capitalism can be considered a species whose survival is independent of
the survival of particular firm, organisations or individuals, so long as they are
replaced by more able or fitter versions. 
Organisations that follow Lamarckian evolution will adapt much more quickly
to their environment than their Darwinian counterparts because Lamarckian
evolution preserves learned traits. However, as (March, 1991; Levinthal and
March, 1993) pointed out, quick learning is a mixed blessing because firms may
adopt the first well-functioning organisational traits that are discovered, and not
take time to explore potentially better ones. Put in different words, the quick
learning capability of Lamarckian evolution can again lead to premature
convergence within an organisational population (see Learning and Synthesis
below). 
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Synthesis of Adaptation and Selection 
Kauffman (1995) finds sole reliance on Darwinism inadequate: “Whether we are
talking about molecules co-operating to form cells or organisms co-operating to
form ecosystems or buyers and sellers co-operating to form markets and
economies, we will find grounds to believe that Darwinism is not enough, that
natural selection cannot be the sole source of the order we see in the world. In
crafting the living world, selection has always acted on systems that exhibit
spontaneous order”. White et al (1997) have researched the biological origin of
ecology. Quoting new research, they find inconsistencies the biological
foundation of ecology. On the other hand they resort to the biologist Campbell,
who strengthens self-organisation and adaptation by introducing evolutionary
drivers [force or energy] and evolutionary directors [pathways]. Weakened
ecology and strengthened adaptation, however, does not necessarily meld the
two together easily. They consider that the physicist David Bohm provides a
synthesis: Bohm’s relationship between mind and matter links blind selection
and self adaptation. Mind and matter are two parallel streams of development
arising from a common ground. Mind grows out of the matter and matter
contains the essence of mind: according to Bohm (2002) both are abstractions
from an irreducible whole, created artificially by the habit patterns of our
thought about reality. Evolution is an example of the intelligence of matter
exploring different structures that go far beyond what is needed for survival.
Thus if there is mind in all matter adaptation can have both intention and
direction.  
Bohm (2002) takes an holistic view of the universe. The essence of his approach
is synthesis between mind and matter; a common essence. For the most part,
those sympathetic with this approach do not speak of a common essence; they
are pragmatic and typically focus on different levels of analysis and
organisational features (Scott, 1987; Singh et al, 1986; Astley and Van de Ven,
1983). Burgelman (1991) noted that an ecological perspective could be applied
within an organisation, as well as between organisations. Here we are speaking of
self-organisation, the whole subject matter in itself, see for example, Kohonen
(1995), Kauffman (1987, 1988, 1995). Therefore organisational form may
evolve as the outcome of environmental selection among strategic initiatives
generated within a particular firm. Significant adaptation occurs through
peripheral changes and restores to the organisation at least a measure of self-
determination. Similarly, Usher, and Evans (1996) studying the evolution of ‘gas’
stations in the US, find use for a Darwinian outlook at population level change
and for a Lamarkian view in preparing the ground for such changes. 1
Environmental Selection
Selection occurs principally through competition among the alternative novel
forms that exist, and factors in the environment select those forms which
optimise or are best suited to the resource base of an environmental niche
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In this work competition rules, natural selection
is blind and possibilities of self-adaptation are narrow. As Carroll (1988) points
out “Organisational ecology is the one new perspective that does not subscribe
to the adaptation model of organisational change… Adaptive change is not
impossible, or even rare, but it is severely constrained”. According to this
outlook, organisations are inert and subject to selection by the business
environment. For example, Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) believe that managers’
ability to adjust flexibly is limited. Size is a factor. According to Aldrich (1979),
small organisations have little choice but to be selected out. Large organisations
are selected out rarely (Edwards, 1979). Moreover, due to sunk costs, historical
precedent, political resistance to change, and so on, which amount to ‘structural
inertia’ organisations are ‘selected out’ and new organisational forms are ‘selected
in’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989) as a result of blind selection processes.
Random variation and density of population, burdening the carrying capacity,
lead to founding and death. 
Density, Death, and Founding
Mortality has been attributed to density, change, uncertainty etc. Density of
organisations, like demographic density, has attracted parallel Malthusian
interest into the de-selection (death) and founding (birth) of organisations.
(Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Baum and Oliver, 1992). Death occurs when the
density of population reaches the carrying capacity, as selection processes only
operate once there is a shortage of resources. The effect of social ties in
preventing, delaying, or for that matter, hastening death, which has been lacking
in most ecological works, has been emphasised by Baum and Oliver (1991) and
Granovetter (1985). Japanese Keiretsu, Korean chaebol, and Taiwanese
Jituanqiye are examples of such social embeddedness (Amburguey and
Hayagreva, 1996). It is likely that the embededness of these organisations was
responsible for the delay in the onset of the Asian crisis in the mid-1990s. 
Organisational founding or the birth rate of organisations is seen by ecologists as
a process depending on ecological forces such as population density and
resources, institutional constraints, size and market power of the existing
organisations, and interaction between sub-populations (Freeman and Lomi,
1994). Ecologists, according to Delacroix and Hayagreeva (1994) describe the
whole history of organisation forms in relation to density as a convex curve, only
departing from it for the growth part of the curve, attributing it to institutional
reasons. Delacroix and Carroll (1983) criticise the exclusion of unsuccessful
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foundings (survivor bias) from most ecological work. Aldrich and Woodward
(1986) see the exclusion as an under-statement of diversity of founding.
Swaminthan (1994), studying American breweries and Argentinian newspapers,
showed that with increasing age, organisations founded under conditions of high
adversity and experience a lower death rate than those founded under low
adversity. Hannan and Carroll (1995) have used the concept of density
dependence (legitimacy) for growth and survival rates in arguing for the
endogeniety of legitimacy. However, density is not limited to the birth and death
rates. It is often used to identify the legitimacy of the form in adaptation and
learning, in particular mimetic learning, for a neo-institutionalist view see
Zucker (1989). Barnett and Amburguey (1990) have distinguished the impact of
large organisations as mass dependence. There are also interesting debates
around density-dependence as a public good versus its reputation (Matthew
effect) see Rao (1994). The most clear-cut opposition to the ecologist view of
density dependence appears in Delacroix and Rao (1994) and in co-evolutionary
discussions as density-independence (see Co-evolution below). 
Adaptation
Complexity theories are divided into two main camps: ecology and adaptation.
Astley and Van de Ven (1983) believe that the adaptation view has historically
dominated organisation theory. They trace these views to Buckley’s ‘complex
adaptive systems’ (Buckley, 1968). Advocates of  adaptation propose that
organisations are flexible and adapt to their environments by changing their
routines and standard operating procedures (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and
March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 1981, March, 1988), and if they fail in
doing, so it is for reasons such as the problem of catching up with rapid change.
White et al (1997) and Kauffman (1988) extend the discussion to consider co-
adaptive processes. On an illustration of adaptation, Constant (1987) comments
that when the turbojet engine began to dominate the aeronautical market, ships
and off-shore oil industries also had to adapt to this kind of engine. In biological
terms, adaptation takes place both at population level (genotypes) and at
phenotype level. 
Population Ecology vs Adaptation
Within a general evolutionary framework, an on-going argument in
organisational science exists as to the relative importance of Adaptationist versus
market-selection pressures (Burgelman, 1991; Lewin and Volberda, 1999).
Makadok and Walker (1996) note that a central question in organisation theory
over the past 30 years is “…whether search behaviour by an organisation confers
a selection advantage…” (p 39). The view that organisations engage in goal-
directed search has a long providence (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and
March, 1963). Adaptationists or advocates of strategic choice (Porter, 1980,
1985; Simon, 1993; March, 1981), broadly consider that managers or dominant
coalitions scan the relevant environment for opportunities and threats, formulate
strategic responses and adjust organisational structure appropriately (Child,
1972). Therefore, strategic direction and organisational form are determined by
managers, and market selection acts to maintain organisations which are good
‘adaptors’. Under this view, an organisation’s fate is largely in its own hands and
organisational research efforts are appropriately focused on individual firms and
individuals within those firms as units of analysis. The Adaptationist argument
presupposes that organisations are capable of adapting at least as fast as their
environment changes (March, 1981; Makadok and Walker, 1996). If firms are
incapable of responding to environmental changes in a similar timescale,
adaptation (or learning) processes will not enhance organisational survival
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984).
Adaptationists
Adaptationists branch into two main classifications, (i) rational Adaptationists
who consider that organisational variability reflects designed, intentional, change
responding to environmental influences, threats and opportunities, and (ii)
random Adaptationists, who posit that while firms do respond to exogenous
influences, the responses are only loosely coupled with those influences. This
grouping notes the difficulties in organisational adaptation processes, including
suggestions that, due to bounded rationality, most adaptation processes are the
result of local search (March, 1991), and that internal knowledge transfers are
imperfect and subject to ‘stickiness’ (Szulanski, 1996).
Population Ecologists
In contrast, populational ecologists have a pessimistic outlook on the strength of
organisational adaptation abilities and consider that the primary driver of
organisational change processes is market selection. Foster and Kaplan (2001)
point out that markets have no past experience or favoured mental models. 2
Markets blindly select and deselect organisations, products and structural forms
as environmental conditions alter. The selection process operates through
competition for scarce resources. Firms which can generate a financial surplus
tend to attract capital and labour resources, whereas less successful firms lose
resources over time (Schumpeter, 1934; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). The
primary research agenda of population ecologists adopts a populational unit of
analysis in order to explain why structural diversity exists amongst organisations
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Carroll and Hannan, 1995). Consequently,
specific research projects concentrate on studies of the processes of organisational
foundings (of both new organisational forms and new organisations), growth,
decline and failures (mortality) of organisational forms and organisations (Singh
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and Lumsden, 1990; Carroll and Hannan, 1995; Chang, 1996; Levinthal,
1991), adopting a population level unit of analysis.
The population ecology school was initially popularised by Hannan and
Freeman (1977), who saw it as providing a critical alternative view on
organisational-environment relations, to that proposed by the dominant
adaptation school. Hannan and Freeman (1977) did allow that organisations
had some ability to adapt to environmental changes and noted that ‘leaders of
organisations do formulate strategies and organisations do adapt to
environmental contingencies’ (p 930). However, they argued that the ability of
firms accurately and consistently to adapt in a world of high uncertainty, where
connections between means and ends are unclear is problematic (Hannan and
Freeman, 1984; Carroll and Hannan, 1995). In addition to the difficulties posed
by uncertainty, the ability of organisations to adapt is highly constrained because
of ‘structural inertia’, stemming from a variety of internal and external sources
including sunk costs, internal political constraints, organisational structure,
organisational history, barriers to industry exit and legitimacy issues (Hannan
and Freeman, 1977). 
Under the population ecology view, differences between firms arise mainly at
time of founding as a result of ‘imprinting forces’ (Boeker, 1989). These include
dominant initial strategy, distribution of influence and degree of management
ownership (Boeker, 1989). Although selection processes select the most ‘fit’ firms
in a given environment, firms are fit because of their initial intentional design,
or luck, rather than because of post-birth adaptation (Barnett and Hansen,
1996). Hannan and Freeman (1984) extended the discussion of structural
inertia by positing that it is a consequence of the selection process, claiming that
“selection processes tend to favour organisations whose structures are difficult to
change” (p 149). The basis of this claim is that organisations which can produce
a good or service ‘reliably’ (consistently of a minimum quality standard) are
favoured by other firms and therefore by market selection processes. The
routines required to produce a good reliably tend to lead to structural inertia.
Hannan and Freeman (1984) and Levinthal (1991) suggest that building these
routines leads to an increase in the complexity of the patterns of links between
organisational sub-units. Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) note that structural
inertia is rooted in the size, complexity and interdependence of the firm’s
structures, systems, procedures and processes, and claim that as systems get more
complex, and as the firm seeks better environment-structure congruence,
systems become increasingly interlinked and changes become costly and
difficult. Theoretical support for these assertions, that increasing organisational
complexity can lead to adaptation difficulties, is found in Kauffman (1993) and
Rivkin (2000), as the heightened degree of interconnection within the firm
would increase the ‘ruggedness’ of the strategic choice landscape faced by an
organisation.
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Critical Evaluation of the Population Ecology Perspective
Perhaps the strongest argument for adopting a populational unit of analysis is
that it facilitates longitudinal studies concerning the success or failures of
organisational strategies and structures (Carroll and Hannan, 1995) and
provides large samples facilitating the use of statistical techniques in testing
specific hypotheses. In addition, the environment faced by an individual firm
consists primarily of other organisations, and the dynamics of this environment
cannot be studied by restricting attention to a single organisation, rather, the
population and its associated ‘turnover’ (births and deaths) must be considered
(Aldrich, 1979). Case studies of single firms, or small numbers of firms, risk
drawing incorrect causal inferences due to ex-post storytelling. 
Selection
Matthews (2003) distinguishes (i) outer dynamics, and (ii) inner dynamics.
Outer dynamics describe Darwinian (or Schumpeterian) selection processes.
Inner dynamics reflect the ability of organisations independently to adapt to
outer dynamics.
The real question about the capacity of an organisation to self adapt hinges on
(i) the size of the environmental change, and (ii) the flexibility or variability of
the genetic or capability structure.
The population ecology school is underpinned by a Darwinian explanation for
organisational diversity. If this is to prove plausible, the existence of three
mechanisms must be demonstrated (Campbell, 1969):
(i) occurrence of variations in the unit of selection
(ii) consistent selection criteria which result in differential
survival of units of selection
(iii) preservation and propagation of positively selected variants
Underlying all of these mechanisms is a definition of the unit of selection.
Population ecologists employ a populational definition, but altering the
definition casts light on a multiplicity of evolutionary processes. Thus,
population ecology is best considered as a subset of a much larger evolutionary
school. Alternative definitions of the unit of selection include products, divisions
of organisations, organisations or networks of organisations (Barnett and
Burgelman, 1996), individual strategic projects or human resources 3 within the
firm (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000), routines 4 (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and
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communities of populations (a collective of interacting organisational
populations) (Singh and Lumsden, 1990). 
(i) The Unit of Selection
A viable definition of the unit of selection requires that (Lovas and Ghoshal,
2000): 
(i) there is variance in the unit which the selection mechanism
can act on 
(ii) the units of selection be independent of one another 
(iii) the units of selection must come to the attention of the
actors in the (social) system who act as agents of selection/
retention
If there is no means of generating variations in the unit of selection, an
evolutionary process cannot exist. In an organisational setting, variation could
result from organisation foundings or through intentional/random adaptation in
existing organisations. If units of selection are not independent, the
interpretation of the selection process is problematic, as it is unclear what is
actually being selected. The third requirement differentiates biological evolution
from evolution in social systems. In social systems, selection criteria are socially
influenced (Aldrich, 1979) and are applied by social actors (investors, customers,
suppliers and staff ). Unless the unit of selection is visible, at least indirectly, to
these actors, it cannot influence their selection process. 
The choice of a suitable unit of selection will be governed by the research
question of interest. However, in organisational settings, the distinction between
various units of selection is not always clear-cut. If a firm changes substantially
between t0 and tx, for example an organisation undergoes a substantial change of
management, staff, investors and product lines, does the change represent the
result of an adaptation process in a firm or does the change more closely
resemble a death and birth process? Similar problems arise when defining
populations. To what extent can a population be considered to exist over a long
time-horizon, especially if an industry has undergone substantial changes in
technology and products? The clarity of the distinction between units of
selection and the selection environment is also open to debate, as they may
interact (Birchenhall, Kastrinos and Metcalfe, 1997). Firms select the
environment in which they operate and can modify that environment,
particularly in concentrated markets. The latter effect in essence, recognises the
co-evolutionary nature inherent in both biological and social systems.
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(ii) Selection Criteria
Having considered the issues surrounding the unit of selection, attention is now
turned to the selection criteria within the evolutionary process. To impact on the
population of organisational designs/strategies coherently, selection processes
must remain broadly stable over time. In an organisational setting, selection
processes revolve around the ability of a unit of selection to attract resources in
order to propagate its existence. Under a Schumpeterian approach, successful
organisations will attract resources, unsuccessful organisations will lose them.
Preservation and propagation of successful variants may occur through
organisational growth and through selective diffusion wherein routines and
structures within organisations seen as prospering would tend to be imitated
(Campbell, 1969). 
(iii) Propagation
Finally, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate to expand Darwinian
metaphors, drawn from biology, into social systems. Most authors in the
evolutionary school of organisational theory, including population ecologists, are
careful in rationalising their choice of an evolutionary framework. Even ardent
proponents of an evolutionary model recognise that there are distinct differences
between biological and organisational adaptation relating to direction
mechanisms, the source of selection criteria, and the possibility of Lamarckian
processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Typically, it is pointed out that no claim is
made for a biological metaphor, that firms behave like biological entities, rather
the claim is that an evolutionary perspective provides a  general conceptual
framework, which if appropriately tailored, may provide insights into the change
behaviour of organisations or the populational properties of organisations (Singh
and Lumsden, 1990; Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
Synthesising the Adaptationist and the Selectionist Approaches to
Organisational Change
The ecological perspective has produced new insights on organisational change.
It has also triggered debates concerning the importance of environmental
determinism versus strategic choice, and the related question of the relative
importance of selection and adaptation processes in explaining organisational
change and survival. Following polarised arguments on these questions between
early population ecologists and adaptationists, recent literature has seen a
recognition that neither adaptation or selection processes provide a complete
explanation of organisational strategy or structure (Lewin and Volberda, 1999).
Rather, each focus on different levels of analysis (Bruderer and Singh, 1996) and
both can be usefully incorporated in an evolutionary framework (Burgelman,
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1991). Simon (1993), noting that organisations exist in a co-evolutionary
environment and hence play a role in determining the nature of selection
pressures facing them, argues that “each organisation competes with the others
for scarce resources and their fates must consequently be decided by some
combination of natural selection and rational adaptation” (p 132). The idea that
strategy can be considered as a means of ‘guiding’ evolutionary processes is
gaining increased attention (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Lewin, Long and Carroll,
1999).
The understanding of the interaction of selection and adaptation processes at a
populational level can be complemented by considering the nature of intra-
organisational adaptation processes. It can be argued that organisational
adaptation partly arises from intra-organisational ecological processes, whereby
successful adaptation of a firm is preceded by internal experimentation and
internal selection (Burgelman, 1991). This idea posits that an organisation
consists of an ecology of strategic initiatives which compete for limited
organisational resources so as to increase their relative importance within the
organisation. 5 Strategy emerges through the operation of internal selection and
retention processes acting on the internal variation associated with strategic
initiatives (Burgelman, 1991). Thus, strategic initiatives rather than individuals
become the appropriate unit of analysis. This combination of selection and
strategic choice serves as a useful counterpoint to the extreme views of blind
natural (external) selection or comprehensive strategic planning (choice). The
first misses the idea of internal selection, the second misses the idea of ecology
(Burgelman, 1994). 
The latest perspectives on the integration of Adaptationist and selectionist views
stem from the field of complexity sciences. White, Marin, Brazeal and Friedman
(1997) argue that organisations are non-equilibrium systems with inherent (non-
directed) self-ordering processes. Selection can only act on organisations once
they are in existence, and the creation and initial imprinting of organisations are
the result of directed processes. Once formed, the organisations are subject to
self-ordering mechanisms. As these processes are not independent of the external
selection environment, the market does not blindly select but rather shapes-and-
selects organisations. Thus selection does not operate independently of
managerial choice and self-organising processes, but rather all three combine.
Organisational Learning
In their classic review, Levitt and March (1988) view organisational learning as
routine-based, history-dependent and target-orientated. Organisations learn by
encoding inferences from history into routines 6 that guide behaviour, enabling
learning to be passed to future generations of employees (Pascale, Millemann
and Gioja, 2000). This encoding can take many forms, ranging from formal
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rulebooks and tacit knowledge, to firm culture which is maintained through
systems of socialisation and control (Belew, 1990). The encoding of past
learning so that it is available even after employee turnover is referred to as
creating an organisational memory (Levitt and March, 1988). In a wider social
setting, Belew (1990) notes that in humans, learning takes place at three levels. 
(i) The results of evolutionary learning processes is encoded in
genetic structures
(ii) Individual learning is encoded in neural structures
(iii) Societal learning is encoded in cultural artifacts. 
Culture allows individual learned knowledge to improve the evolutionary fitness
of other con-specific (members of the same species). This perspective
demonstrates the tangled complexity of social learning.  Cultural learning arises
from an interplay of evolutionary and individual learning; in turn, individual
learning is influenced by evolution and culture. In an organisational setting,
biological evolutionary processes are replaced by organisational adaptation and
market selection forces. The interplay of these forces in technology search is
poorly understood (Levinthal, 1997). Although learning is generally considered
to arise when knowledge or experience is accumulated, Levinthal and March
(1981) construct an alternative framework which focuses on the processes of
learning.
The optimal rate of learning for an organisation is poorly understood.
Intuitively, faster learning would appear preferable, particularly in view of the
rapid dissemination of technological innovations. Mansfield (1985) estimated,
based on an empirical study, that detailed information on a new product leaks
within 12 months of its introduction. Unfortunately, learning processes have
significant limitations as a means of information transfer (Levinthal and March,
1993). The ability to learn successfully presupposes that experience is correctly
interpreted in terms of cause and effect relationships and that ‘superstitious
learning’ (March, 1981) is avoided. The value of past learning can be negated by
environmental change. Levinthal and March (1981) note that fast learning
means quick adaptation to new signals. This may result in quick adaptation to
incorrect signals. This has obvious implications when applied to ‘tipping’
industries (Arthur, 1989). Fast adaptation also reduces the time spent exploring
possible alternatives. 
Role of Absorption Capacity in Organisational Adaptation
Although they were not the first to address the idea (Winter, 1984), Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) drew a useful distinction between internal innovation and the
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ability of a firm to assimilate useful external innovations. This ability is termed
an organisation’s ‘absorption capacity’. The greater this capacity, the greater the
organisation’s ability to imitate new product or process innovations and to
exploit knowledge from external basic research findings. The level of absorption
capacity of an organisation has two primary components. Initially, the
organisation must capture the relevant information from its environment
(external learning) and then must be capable of communicating it internally
(internal learning) (Simon, 1991). The internal transfer of information can be
difficult or ‘sticky’ (Szulanski, 1996) due to a lack of internal absorption
capacity. The success of absorptive learning depends critically on gatekeeping
and boundary-spanning roles within the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), as
well as the degree of causal ambiguity associated with the information being
transferred. The internal learning component of absorption capacity suggests
why it can be difficult to successfully ‘buy-in’ the relevant expertise if an
unforeseen technology emerges. Effective absorption capacity requires that
individuals understand both the new technology and the internal structure of
the organisation. New employees may be less effective at communicating
internally.
This points to two interesting trade-offs. Increasing employee diversity, both in
terms of background and prior working experience will tend to increase the
potential for external absorption capacity (Simon, 1991). However, increasing
employee turnover may decrease the ability of an organisation to assimilate
innovations internally. The second trade-off concerns the degree of inter-
connection within an organisation. Even if an organisation has high quality
information capturing processes, absorption capacity may be lessened if it has
many highly interconnected routines. Such processes are more time-consuming
and expensive to change (Bruderer and Singh, 1996, p1330) and inherently
stifle initial trials of innovative processes. 
Fitness Landscapes
The concept of strategic and organisational adaptation as a search process is
well-developed (March 1991; Simon, 1996; Fleming and Sorenson 2001).
Implicitly, this assumes a search-space, in other words, a landscape. The
landscape metaphor (‘surfaces of selective value’) was first introduced by Wright
(1932). The metaphor sought to explain Darwinian evolution (Darwin, 1859)
as a search on a landscape, where the base of the landscape is defined by a
species’ genetic composition and ‘height’ on the landscape corresponds to a
measure of the ‘fitness’ of the species as determined by its success in surviving
and reproducing in its environment. In this framework, biological evolution
represents a search over genotypic space, in a effort to enhance phenotypic
fitness. Translating this into organisational terms, strategists trawl across a
landscape of possible organisational designs and strategies, searching for peaks,
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corresponding to profitable strategies, and avoiding low-lying regions,
corresponding to poor strategies. These landscapes are not fixed, but deform
over time 
◆ as linked landscapes alter (those of suppliers, customers) 
◆ in response to Red-Queen affects
◆ in response to technological change.
Hence, in a  Schumpeterian fashion, ‘standing still’ is never a viable long-term
strategy. Although search and landscape metaphors closely parallel the concept of
seeking sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1980, 1985), it is only in
recent years that the landscape metaphor has been explicitly recognised in
organisational science (Beinhocker, 1999; Kitts, Edvinsson and Beding, 2001;
McCarthy and Tan, 2000; Rivkin, 2000, 2001; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). 
Landscapes can be considered at differing levels of granularity, either at a macro-
level of species (industries) or a micro-level of individual firms. For example,
fitness landscapes can be used to depict how the US car industry fell into a
‘competency trap’ during the 1970s and early 1980s, because “it got stuck on
the local performance hill of producing large cars for the US market”. 7
Random variation, sometimes dubbed as blind variation, is essential for
founding in ecology. The work of Freeman and Hannan (1984), which regards
foundings as discrete random values - despite being anathema to adaptation and
learning - has opened the way for many empirical research and simulations in
the domain of learning. On the other hand, co-evolutionary writers Van De Ven
and Garud (1994) show strong ecological leanings when they attribute founding
primarily to novel technical form. Variation is sometimes viewed as identical to
the birth of organisational forms as a carrying-out of new combinations
(Lumsden and Singh, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934; Van de Ven and Grazman,
1994). Variation through crossover is borrowed from biology. In relation to
organisations, variation through crossover is analogous to innovation defined as
re-combination or a new combination of existing routines (Kogut and Zander,
1992; Lumsden and Singh, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934; Van de Ven and Grazman,
1994). Takadama et al (1997) view crossover as a means of transforming local
communications into a global one (see learning cost). The genetic operator,
crossover (re-combination), effectively creates plausible new organisational forms
because they are combinations of previously successful organisational building
blocks. Davis (1991: Ch3) discusses advantages and disadvantages of different
crossover methods, such as two-point crossover and uniform crossover; for
treating crossover operators as a combination of probabilistic linear
decompositions and a randomised search see Aizawa (1998). 
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Utility of Landscape Metaphors
Landscape models represent tropes. Tropes are departures from literal language
which convey meaning (Smith, 1998 p250). Examples of tropes include,
metaphors, similes and metonymys. 8 When landscape models were initially
developed, the intention was to enhance understanding of evolutionary
processes. Later, the metaphors were translated into non-evolutionary settings as
it appeared that they could provide useful insight into a range of problems. To
the extent that the metaphors assist rather than hinder understanding, these
applications are useful. As noted by Lissack (1996b), meanings and metaphors
matter. Language, both verbal and visual, is the vehicle through which ideas are
transmitted and understood (Smith, 1998: p246). It is not neutral. Language
helps convey patterns from mind to mind and pattern recognition plays a key
role in human decision making. Many decisions are unique in that the precise
circumstances will never be repeated, for example, consider the myriad of
decisions faced by a car driver. Yet, despite this, pattern recognition capabilities
allow the driver to take a decision based on past experience. Metaphors act as a
pattern recognition device, allowing decision makers to conceptualise unique
decisions in terms of the chosen metaphor. They shape how a decision-maker
sees the world. New metaphors can create a new reality but it must be noted
that the choice of metaphor may be value-laden.
The meanings ascribed to a firm, its products and competitors, determine the
range of strategic options which management consider. In a discussion of
complexity theory, Lissack (1996a) comments that “what complexity science
metaphors do for an organisation is give its members access to both new worlds
and new possibilities for action” (p122). Thus, “word choice in usage delimits
possibility space and helps to determine the adjacent possible” (p122). New
metaphors are useful to the extent that they free management from older,
restrictive mental models. 
Mutation 
Mutation is a novel kind of variation. Variation through mutation parallels
playful experimentation (Levitt and March, 1988) and incorrect transmission of
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). It behaves secretively. For the ‘secret
handshake’ of ostensibly docile mutants see Robson, (1995). The genetic
operator, mutation, which infrequently and randomly changes some
information, can reinstall lost or novel information. Mutation is important if a
given population is small (relative to the number of routines) or if the
population faces a continuously changing environment, because mutation can
prevent premature convergence toward an inferior organisational design. In
those cases, mutation plays the role of shifting an evolutionary search from
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exploiting existing routines toward exploring new routines (Holland, 1992;
Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991).
Retention
Retention is the last in the chain of variation-selection-retention (see application
in co-evolution below). Retention involves the forces (including inertia and
persistence) that perpetuate and maintain certain technical and institutional
forms that were selected in the past (Aldrich 1979).
Two Forms of Mutual Adaptation
Co-evolution
The concept of co-evolution arises from the limited perspective of one-
population ecology. Two populations reliant on common resources can influence
each other directly or indirectly through resources. Co-evolution may involve
more than two populations and include some sub-populations, becoming nearly
a community. In turn, communities can be viewed as a case for co-evolution (see
community evolution below). Co-evolution may involve technology and
government; for a typical study of co-evolution involving day-care centres and
nurseries in Canada involving public financing see Baum and Singh, 1994. The
counter-intuitive phenomenon that increased government assistance may
actually reduce the population size in one category instead of increasing it,
motivates the authors to examine the positive and negative feedback extensively.
The results lead them to argue that “… as a result of higher order feedback
processes the effects of changes in one variable frequently belay intuitions based
on simple cause-effect logic of linear relations between independent and
dependent variables”. Clearly, as one moves to more complex phenomena the
system properties such as feedback become more important. Changes in one
variable are caused endogenously by changes in others. This requires co-
evolution (Singh, 1990; Singh and Lumsden, 1990).
An Example: the Co-evolutionary development of hearing aids.
Various studies involve the co-evolution of technical and institutional events
(Van de Van and Raghud 1994), or that of technology and organisation.
Rosenkopf and Tushman (1994); Van de Van and Raghud, 1994) study the
development of hearing aids (cochlear) in which (i) one group of businesses, led
by House-3M alliance, and some official support, develop and market the one-
channel device. (ii) Another group, led by Nucleaus and encouraged by
university research, focus on the multi-channel device. In the end the latter won.
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The development pattern is summarised by the authors: “Technical variations
peak in 1986-87, institutional rule-making (selection ) events in 1988-89, and
rule-following (retention) events sometime later”; but worried about possible
causality implication they add: “The aggregate temporal sequence does not
indicate causality … at a micro level these events even may co-produce each
other”.
An Example: technology development
Rosenkopf and Tushman (1994) observe a two-stage cycle of  technological
‘Fermentation’ (uncertainty, chaos and variation) followed by ‘Convergence’
(reorientation to dominant design). They comment, “None-supporters of
dominant technology reorient or vanish, and inter-organisational agreements
around the dominant systems are strengthened. This period also brings the
predominance of institutions that elaborate and retain technology such as
standards bodies, educational curricula, and professional societies”. At this stage
there is a tendency to monopoly and emphasis on prices. This tendency has
institutional support: the dominance of transistor-based components of radio
over vacuum-tube transmitters supported by the Navy during the war is a case in
point. The concept of co-evolution is growing rapidly and has spread from
academia to business applications. 9
Community Evolution
Co-evolutionists do not segregate their territory, whereas the communal
evolutionists prefer to distinguish themselves in a Durkheimian sense in terms of
scope and integrative processes. Barnett (1994) defines communities as
“collectivities of organisations united through the bond of commensalism or
symbiosis”. Britain (1994) has studied the population of semi-conductor
populations using an extended version of Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model of
density. His main finding is that when the constraint of resources (carrying
capacity) is relaxed, both entry and exit rates tend to increase inviting the wider
influence of the environment. Thus, proactively, he replaces the density-
dependence of ecologists with density-independence in the title of his article.
Barnett’s (1994) study of independent telephone companies versus the
monopoly power of Bell displays a similar outlook. The study could be regarded
as a co-evolution between the community of independents and the giant Bell,
but he prefers the community context probably to test Hawley’s theorem that
the development of community structure through symbiotic organisational
forms lessens the vulnerability to the exogenous environment: “If that structure
is poorly co-ordinated the fitness of the entire community is reduced”. He
attributes the lengthy period of recovery (16 years) after the technological shocks
to the symbiotic cohesion. The direct effect of technology and the indirect
impact through Bell provide a similar frame of complexity to (Baum and Singh
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1994)(see Co-evolution above). Porac (1994) (who appreciates Barnett)
statistical work, is, however, critical of his attachment to the ecological umbilical
cord. To emphasise the role of social, economic and institutional influences as a
methodology  of ‘higher conceptualisation’. Porac argues that: “fitness is an issue
but it would be very clear that an ecological analysis is an abstract overlay on a
complex psychosocial reality”. The central notion here (2) is that organisational
learning is a means by which they evolve.
Summary of Discussion So Far
The major issue raised in the first section is the extent to which organisations are
capable of self-adaptation, or whether they are like ‘leaves driven by the wind’,
entirely at the mercy of Darwinian or Schumpeterian selection processes. If the
latter is the dominant pressure, the role of organisational strategy, as such, is
minimal. Survival depends upon the strength of external pressures and the
variability of the genetic (or capability) base of the organisation.
Discussion of organisational learning has centred mainly on the ability of the
organisation to embed experience in routines, cultures and architectures.
We now move to a direct consideration of organisational learning.
Evolutionary Learning
The general concepts of Evolutionary Learning are shown in Table 2 below.
Concept 
Random
Learning
Baldwin Effect
Cost of Learning
Definition 
Learning without plan
Learning alters the shape of the search space
in which evolution operates  and thereby
provides good evolutionary path towards
sets of co-adapted alleles (different forms of
the same gene).
Increased average fitness in phenotypes
(learning), blunts the genotype
differentiation thus hindering the evolution
(also called Hiding Effect).
Selected References
Hannan and  Freeman,
1984, and 19891
Hinton and Nowlan,
1987
Mayley (1997)
Table 2: General Concepts of Evolutionary Learning
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Concept 
Classifier Systems
(CS)
Efficiency:
Performance and
Aspirations
Attainment
Discrepancy
Exploration and
Exploitation
Convergence and
Reorientation
Fermentation and
Congruence
Mimetic Learning
Docile Learning
Evolutionary
Engineering.
Definition 
A system's knowledge could be represented
as a population of competing condition-
action rules ('classifiers'), subject to
reproduction, variation, and selection
resulting in gradual system improvement.
In the short run, efficiency results from
failure, and innovation from success (slack).
Performance in the long term is a function
of search (learning) propensities and
increased variations.
Aspirations attributable to business
optimism overtakes performance.
Exploitation the situation in which one
organism gains at the expense of another.
Exploration is search for new possibilities.
Long-term incremental change and
adaptation, which elaborate structures,
systems, controls and resources toward
increased co-alignment
Technological breakthroughs trigger a
discontinuous but relatively short period of
competition between alternative
technological regimes (fermentation).  This
era closes when social and political
dynamics select a dominant product design
from among competing alternatives.
Partial or complete imitation of other forms
in contrast to creating novel organisational
forms as re-combinations of existing forms.
Simon (1990) believes that a simple and
robust mechanism, based on human
docility and bounded rationality can
account for the evolutionary success of
genuinely altruistic behaviour.
The use of genetic-algorithm-based models
to make normative judgements on how to
more effectively guide the evolution of
complex modern firms
Selected References
Holland 1986, 1992);
Wilson (1995,1997)
adds  accuracy and
generality to CS.
March 1981) and Lant
(1989)
Lant (1989)
March (1992) March
(1993). Warglen
(1995)
Tushman and
Romanelli (1985) Lant
& Mezias (1992)
Utterback &
Abernathy. 1975). For
an interesting
application see
(Rosenkopf and
Tushman, 1994)
DiMaggio and Powell,
1983); Lant and
Mezias, 1990, 1992); (
Mezias and Lant,
1994), modifying
them slightly. Hannan
& Freeman, (1989).
Simon (1996)
Bruderer, (1993);
March, (1994); Van de
Ven and Grazman,
(1994)
Natural Selection and Learning
The connection between natural selection and learning was first proposed a
century ago by two biologists (Baldwin, 1896; Morgan, 1896) and has recently
been rediscovered by Hinton and Nowlan (1987) and Belew (1990). While
admiring Hinton and Nowlan’s (1987) elegant work, Belew adds culture to their
model, an element which is missing in the literature. Both Baldwin and Morgan
proposed that in the case of biotic evolution, only some of the inherited traits
are genetically fixed; others are unspecified and must be learned during an
organism’s lifetime. Organisms which inherit poor unspecified traits - that is,
poor learning capabilities - will not survive the evolutionary race. In contrast,
organisms that inherit good unspecified traits will be able to learn traits crucial
for survival. Learning and selection are fundamentally interdependent processes
because adaptation enhances inertia, even as inertia accelerates the process of
environmental selection and organisational evolution (Levinthal 1991). Selection
will favour the capacity to acquire traits whether heritable or not (Bruderer and
Singh, 1996), for organisational learning as an example of adaptation. 10
Learning and Flexible Evolutionary Search
A key argument in Hinton and Nowlan (1987) is that an evolutionary process is
more effective if new organisational forms inherit only some fixed routines from
previously successful organisations, while letting others remain open to
organisational learning. To quote, “it is positively advantageous to leave some
decisions to learning rather than specifying them genetically”. 11 This openness
allows firms initially to choose some of their key routines  - and correct them, if
necessary, later. Thus, organisational learning constructs a region of increased
fitness around the maximum fitness, transforming it into a gentler hill. A hill
can be searched more effectively by an evolutionary process because the process
is constantly guided toward the top of the hill, where fitness is greatest, “It is like
trying to find a needle in a haystack with continual feedback provided about
whether one is getting closer” (Hinton and Nowlan, 1987). 12
Learning Can Guide and Speed Up Evolution
Hinton and Nowlan (1987) note that learning is not just a matter of survival; it
guides and leads the search, “Learning alters the shape of the search space in
which evolution operates and thereby provides good evolutionary path towards
sets of co-adapted alleles”. 13 For a parallel outlook see Maynard Smith (1987).
Learning not only guides but also speeds it up (20 times according to Hinton
and Nowlan (1987), and many times more for Bruderer (1996)). The impact on
the evolutionary path is through increased fitness. Thus, routines that contribute
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to a high fitness level in an organisational form spread rapidly through a
population (Holland, 1992).
Cost of Learning: Search Costs
In Hinton and Nowlan (1987), the cost of learning is not an issue. Learning
cost in terms of research expenses for refinement and innovation is mentioned in
Levinthal and March (1981) and their followers (see Learning Efficiency
below).The maladaptive ‘Red Queen effect’ is also some kind of cost that
optimists should bear in mind. Barnett and Hansen (1996) have argued that a
considerable number of Illinois banks suffered failures because of this effect. In
essence, the Red Queen effect involves competitors in a rat race of learning
which sometimes can be reinforcing, but can also be ruinous.
More recently, the cost of learning is viewed more directly in terms of
complexity costs. Apart from the dollar cost of chasing the best traits, we are
faced with an evolutionary or complexity cost. It is argued that mass learning of
the best traits has a hiding effect, which counters the Baldwin effect. Learning of
these traits takes place in the phenotype space whereas population evolution
takes place at the genotype space. Without learning there is a correlation
between phenotypic ascent and genotypal adaptation, but learning, despite
raising the average fitness in phenotypes, blunts the differentiation and thus
hinders the evolution (Johnston 1982, for biological review; Turney, 1996;
Anderson, 1995; and Mayley, 1996, for A-Life literature). This hiding effect is
regarded as a cost by Mayley (1997). By simulating centroids of genotypal
generations and their correlation, he finds patterns of declining centroid motion
(or increasing costs) that result from learning. Similar graphs are produced for
epistasis, which has parallel effects to costs. The two provide a motley of
hindrances to the Baldwin effect. In this work there is no let up except for the
compensatory effect of lower epistasis. 14
Complexity
Robson’s (1995), argument that equilibrium evolution ends up in abandoning
evolution and complexity gently because it is expensive is a clear example of
complexity cost. In a similar vein, Seth (1997) reveals a cost of complexity. This
is the fitness cost of long genotypes. With eight runs of simulation, he shows that
the high cost deadens complexity into monotony but complexity flourishes with
low costs. In cases of high cost, environmental noise is thought to kick-start
complexity. He concludes that the gains of learning and acquiring fitness in
complexity is well worth the small costs - if not a large tariff. Recently,
organisational costs are also looked at from control and communication angle.
Takadama et al (1997), studying organisational learning of robot groups, have
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distinguished between the cost of global and local learning. They say it is easier
to evaluate action by employing a global function as an outside control; except
that it is costly to communicate in this way.
Kauffman’s (1993, 1994) work in this field is seminal. He asserts that random
selection is unlikely to produce evolutionary changes because of the large
numbers of possible configurations, if search space is examined ergodically.
Hence he argues for some form of self adaptation.   
Classifier Systems
Classifier systems involve parallel, message passing, and rule-based systems, in
which many rules are active simultaneously. The rules in a classifier system are
the counterpart of interacting standard operating procedures (Holland 1992): in
a condition-action form, so that a rule comes into force as soon as the condition
exists – typically posting a message that brings rules into play.
Learning Efficiency: Performance and Aspirations
Cost often comes to light with efficiency. In their influential work, Levinthal
and March (1981) emphasise efficiency only in relation to the short-term view,
downturn in business, search for refinement, and allocation of resources. The
opposite, environmental condition, is the long-term view, upturn in business,
innovation, and slack which means available rent; but this is all first order
response. The second order response is more complex: the environment is full of
ambiguity and uncertainty. Now the goal posts begin to move and behaviour is
constantly adapted to changing goals, resulting from success and failure and
subjective aspiration levels. At this level, they find efficiency problematic as the
optimum returns form the basis for efficiency are ambiguous. Four main
findings at this level are: 
◆ performance in the long term is a function of search
propensities
◆ variation increases as the propensity to search develops
◆ quick Learners adapt quickly to current signals: they also
adapt quickly to false signals which, if acted upon, can
deplete the useful stock of experience. So the relationship
between learning rate and performance is complicated.
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◆ uncertainty reduces the frequency of subjective success when
the technology is improving and reduces the failure when
the technology is declining. 
March (1988) takes up the success history of organisations discussed in the
previous paper to give more prominence to history dependence and the
dialectics of decay and renewal. Accumulated success and reputation by analogy
reduce risk taking and make efficiency seeking based on the old knowledge a
prominent concern. Failure on the other hand enhances risk taking and the
chance of renewal.  
The concept of aspiration levels (targets), discussed in both these papers, is taken
up by Lant (1989). She finds Levinthal and March’s (1981), adaptive aspirations
to be tantamount to rational expectation which may lead to the assumption that
aspiration levels and performance undergo equivalent changes. In Lant, in
contrast, aspirations take the upper hand, resulting in attainment discrepancy
attributable to business optimism. Despite some inconclusive statistics she hits
on an interesting finding: at early stages learning is dominated by attainment
discrepancy but at later stages of experience, in all four industries she researched,
there appears to be a hint of rational expectations driving the discrepancy to
zero. Lant (1989) uses the Markstrat complex game involving teams of top
management who are assigned roles to play.
Mezias and Glynn (1993) also rely on Levinthal and March’s (1981) innovative
work heavily. They manage to operationalise the source work’s main tenets by a
flowchart: the search decision starts with search experience which is followed by
the assessment of this experience in terms of success and failure. The next stage
is performance, which is followed by assessment in terms of meeting the targets.
Meeting targets or aspirations lead to refinement, and failure to variance with
ultimate potential of innovation. In judging failure and success they rely on
more elaborate cost estimations. The interesting finding of the work is that
organisational learning is more cost-effective with an evolutional approach than
with institutional and revolutional perspectives.
Types of Learning
Exploration and Exploitation
The distinction between exploration and exploitation is an off-shoot of
ecological selection and adaptation. Exploitation of old certainties is compared
and contrasted to exploration of new possibilities by examining two situations:
◆ learning for competitive advantage
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◆ learning between the members of an organisation and the
organisational code.
March (1992) argues that: adaptive processes by refining exploitation more
rapidly than exploration are more likely to be effective in the short-run but self-
destructive in the long-run. This tendency for self-destruction is ameliorated by
new entrants and diversity. For a balance between exploration and exploitation
(see Levinthal and March (1993)). Warglen (1995) tries to bring about a balance
by consciously synthesising the two: the interactions among different process
levels within the firm lead to the emergence of an adaptation style by
dynamically tuning explorations efforts and exploitation opportunities, “In
complex environments this results in waveform process of discovery and
learning, which may be subject to competence and memory traps”. See Levinthal
and March (1993) for confidence traps. The rise of competence replication
along innovation cycles result in singling out the organisation’s traits and their
modification.
Convergence and Reorientation
There is another dilemma parallel to that of exploration and exploitation:
convergence and reorientation. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) defined
convergence as periods of equilibrium characterised by “relatively long time
spans of incremental change and adaptation, which elaborate structures, systems,
controls and resources toward increased co-alignment”. Lant and Mezias (1992)
take up the idea and, despite considerable agreement with those authors,
introduce some modifications. They explain convergence with single loop
learning and reorientation with second loop learning, terms coined by Senge
(1990). The concept is illustrated by the development of GenRad from the
convergent stage of sticking to routines to the stage of innovation.
The transition stems from the environmental change but is driven by the
dichotomy between performance and competence level. The adaptation of
aspirations to routines, which complicates the dynamics of stability and change,
is seen as a complexity issue. They arrive at the following propositions to explain
this complexity:
◆ organisational change will increase following environmental
change and will decrease during environmental stability
◆ organisations with adaptive search routines will be more
responsive for environmental change than those with
imitative or Garbage Can routines
◆ firms with high change potential are more likely to change
in response to environment than firms with low potential
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◆ high-performing firms will exhibit fewer changes than low
performing firms
◆ large firms will be more inert than small firms
◆ ambiguity between performance and organisational traits
reduces responsiveness.  
By testing this complex relationship they distinguish themselves from Tushman
and Romanelli (1985) in concluding controversially that learning and i n n ova t i o n
are the outcome of routines and there is little scope for top management. 15
Fermentation and Congruence
This model posits that technological breakthroughs are variations which trigger a
discontinuous but relatively short period of ferment and competition between
alternative technological regimes. This era of fermentation closes when social
and political dynamics select a dominant product design from among competing
alternatives. The selected dominant design subsequently evolves through a
relatively long retention period of incremental process improvements
(congruence), which in turn is interrupted by the next technological
discontinuity or round of product innovation. This process is called The
‘Cyclical Model of Technological Change’, Utterback and Abernathy (1975);
Rosenkopf and Tushman (1994), provide the example. Three distinct types of
continuous wave variants emerged: alternator, arc, and vacuum-tube
transmitters, but the latter came to dominate the market. In the American
photographic industry, eras of incremental change ended with the introduction
of collodion plates, gelatin plates, and roll films (Jenkins, 1975).
Mimetic Learning
This method of learning puts more emphasis on routine learning rather than
risking for innovation. For an understanding of routines it is useful to know that
genetic transmission of organisational routines happens when:
◆ a new organisation is created
◆ parts of other organisational forms are imitated (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Nelson and Winter, 1982)
◆ parts of a company are acquired or divested (Winter, 1990). 
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Instead of creating novel organisational forms as recombinations of existing
forms, termed the Schumpeterian mode of variation, it has been argued that
entrepreneurs imitated entire organisational forms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Lant and Mezias, 1990, 1992; Mezias and Lant, 1994), modifying them slightly.
Hannan and Freeman (1989) call this mimetic variation. Mezias and Lant
(1994) assign an original role for mimetic learning by arguing against ecologists
and institutionalists: Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) contention that change is
random with respect to future value implies that the study of insert firms
replacing each other is all that is necessary in order to understand the evolution
of organisational populations. They concede that the search process based on
learning from large firms is institutional but argue that there are still 20 per cent
mimetic firms who survive long-term transformation of core routines. Makadok
and Walker (1996) have argued that most of the average money market funds
“are not so lucky to mimic”, and will have to adjust to the growth patterns.
Equilibrium None-Equilibrium Evolution
Dosi et al (1995) have made an interesting criticism of convergent learning and
equilibrium-seeking evolution. Their basic point is that these models avoid
incorporating innovation, which is a complex issue. They come out with a
stochastic model for learning dynamics classified as Schumpeter Mark II. 
Simulation and Learning
Simulation has been used to understand how individual organisations learn
(Herriott, Levinthal and March, 1985; Levinthal and March, 1981; Lounama
and March, 1987; Morecroft, 1985) and to show how populations of
organisations evolve, for example, Lant and Mezias (1990, 1992) Mezias and
Lant (1994) Nelson and Winter (1982) Mezias and Glynn (1993) have
modelled individual firms for  routines. 
Hinton and Nowlan (1987) find simulation for Lamarkian outlook more
difficult compared to Darwinian tradition. The ‘exploration versus exploitation’
model by March (1991) is in Darwinian mode. Organisational behaviour, as a
set of routines, is typical computer modelling (Cohen, 1981; Cohen, March,
and Olsen, 1972; Cyert and March, 1963; Lant and Mezias, 1990, 1992; Mezias
and Glynn, 1993; Mezias and Lant, 1994). Most models have rested on the
assumption that entire new organisational forms are imitated at a rate
proportional to their frequency in the population (Lant and Mezias, 1990,
1992). 
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Social Learning
A critical aspect of human learning is that it is ‘social’ or ‘distributed. Such
phenomenon transcend human social systems. Inspired by studies of social
insects and studies of the flocking behaviour of birds and fish, a recent stream of
research has emerged in the social sciences which concentrates on the application
of a ‘swarm’ metaphor to social systems (Kennedy, Eberhart and Shi, 2001). The
essence of insect/flocking behaviour is that the resulting social systems exhibit
flexibility, robustness and self-organisation (Bonabeau, Dorigo and Theraulaz,
1999). Although these systems can exhibit remarkable co-ordination of activities,
this co-ordination does not stem from a ‘centre of control’ rather it is self
organised. The emergent, collective behaviour that emerges from a group of
social agents has been termed ‘swarm intelligence’ (Bonabeau and Theraulaz,
2000).
Extending the metaphor to human systems, Kennedy, Eberhart and Shi (2001)
argue the importance of social interactions for learning and evolutionary
advance, noting that individuals are not “… isolated information-processing
entities…” (Kennedy, Eberhart and Shi, 2001: p.xv). Rather they learn from
each other. The affect of this social behaviour is to assist individuals to adapt to
their environment, “… by providing individuals with more information than
their own senses can gather” (p.xv). Communication (interactions) between
individuals in a social system may be direct or indirect. An example of the
former could arise when two organisations trade with one another. Examples of
the latter include 
◆ the observation of the success (or otherwise) of a strategy
being pursued by another organisation
◆ ‘Stigmergy’ (Bonabeau and Theraulaz, 2000) which arises
when an organisation modifies the environment, which in
turn causes an alteration of the actions of another
organisation at a later time
Altruism, Docility, and Learning
Simon (1996) argued that it is difficult to account for true altruism, defined as
behaviour that reduces the fitness of the altruist but increases average fitness in
society. He believes that a simple and robust mechanism, based on human
docility and bounded rationality, can account for the evolutionary success of
genuinely altruistic behaviour. Because docility (receptivity to social influence)
contributes greatly to fitness in the human species, it will be positively selected.
Docile people learn and avoid risk, “They do not have to learn about hot stoves
by touching them” (Child similarly argued that you do not have to be devoured
- 31 -
by bears to learn that they are vicious animals). Simon (1996) says that for
gaining that benefit they can be ‘taxed’, as long as it is not too heavy to cancel
the advantages of docility. Limits on rationality in the face of environmental
complexity prevent the individual from avoiding the ‘tax’ (Simon, 1990). In
Simon’s framework, specific learning capabilities, such as docility, lead to an
evolutionary advantage and will be positively selected over time.
Evolutionary Engineering
Evolutionary change is often viewed as emergent and non-intentional for an
individual organisation. However, as March (1991) argued, premature
convergence, by losing variety within its gene pool of routines, can be
detrimental to organisational evolution. To avoid the convergence trap and
stimulate a balanced evolutionary path some possibilities have been suggested: 
◆ recombining of the existing parts of firms and internal
resources (Burgelman, 1991)
◆ using and experimenting with slack resources as a buffer
against organisational controls (Cyert and March, 1963)
◆ promotion of risk-takers (March,1981; 1988)
◆ loose coupling (Weick, 1979), suggests, in what is called a
portfolio approach, “… seeding many diverse projects and
many diverse experiments”.
In these ways managers are seen as evolutionary engineers guiding the process of
‘breeding’ high-performing, novel organisational forms (Bruderer, 1993; March,
1994; Van de Ven and Grazman, 1994). They can use genetic-algorithm-based
models to make normative judgments on how to more effectively guide the
evolution of complex modern firms. Computer simulations can readily generate
a large number of possible evolutionary scenarios from which managers can
choose the more effective ones for implementation in the real world.
Computational models may illuminate when organisations might do well to
increase or decrease their capability to learn, contingent upon different degrees
of turbulence in the business environment (Bruderer, 1996). The ECAL papers
(1997) provide a good source for further update research on evolutionary
engineering.
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Evolutionary Learning and Institutional Factors
Amburguey (1996) believes that study of how population levels change is jointly
shaped by efficiency considerations and institutional processes are sorely needed
to enrich the dialogue among those positing economic, ecological, and
institutional models of organisations. This is a correct assessment. Judging by
(Mezias and Glyn, 1993) treatment of ‘Institutional Paradoxes’, where
institutional impact is packaged away as beaurocratic and convergent, it is clear
that genuine interaction is not frequent. Some efforts, however, are taking place.
In Groenwegen’s collection Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, Dietrich
(1996), argues that learning helps reduce transaction cost. Transaction Cost
Economics for him is a ‘comparative static’ which is complemented by
institutional influence, justifying the word beyond in the title. Nooteboom
(1996) provides a learning-based model of transactions, and Pitelis (1996), by
studying labour costs in the Athens, attributes most transaction costs to
institutional factors. The choice of profit instead of efficiency for consideration
seem to guide his argument. Economics works with a complexity slant are now
cognisant of the need to be attentive to institutional matters (Anderson, Arrow,
and D. Pines, 1988; Tisdell, 1996; Day and Chen, 1993).
However, to generalise a little, it is obvious that despite huge developments in
the evolutionary fields, multi-disciplinary work does not progress smoothly. This
is probably because the social scientists still have difficulty with the biological
roots of the evolutionary science. Krugman (1996), for instance, despite his
work Self-Organising Economies finds much of the ‘bio-babble’ difficult to
absorb. Mirowski (1996), one of the contributors to the Keynesian Malvern
collection, provides a brief history of Santa Fe, and its main actors, outlining the
delayed application of biological findings to economics. He believes the
economists of Santa Fe do not reflect the innovative nature of evolutionary
physics and biology and are the optimisers of the old school.
On the other hand (Low and Simon, 1995) object to the sloppy application of
biological terms to economics and management, for instance they argue
efficiency is irrelevant in biology but is vitally important in organisational
management
Conclusions and Discussion
It was argued that evolutionary learning is establishing itself as a viable and
growing branch of organisational learning. It is no longer limited to natural
phenomena and human populations; evolutionary learning is now being applied
to neural networks and Artificial-Life, both in industry and finance. As
evolutionary learning gains momentum, the eternal debate of ecology versus
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adaptation, which used to be limited to biology with the ecological view taking
the upper hand, is once again rekindled. This is because adaptive learning in
industry and commerce has brought dazzling results. Bearing in mind the
pervasive role of this debate in evolutionary learning, whether at behavioural or
theoretical level, considerable weight was given to the basic concepts of this
debate. Despite credible efforts by major scholars to synthesise the two elements
of evolution, the dichotomy keeps manifesting itself. Due to the density of
content in this paper, the conclusion will have to content itself with three
grounds of interplay between selection and adaptation.
Self-Organisation and Adaptation
The two schools of thought, ecology versus selection and their synthesis were
discussed in terms of Neo-Darwinian and Lamarkian views. For synthesis, it was
shown how ideas from physics, biology and human organisations are brought
together to provide a convincing picture of the compromise. Self-organisation,
by introducing a sense of knowledge in local interactions, serves as a building
block in arguments for synthesis. This type of synthesis is promoted by
Kauffman (1995) and is discussed by White et al (1998) at some length.
Reflecting these approaches, Takadama’s self-organising robots, for instance,
receive the same information from the environment but in local interactions
they know what actions to avoid. Self-organisation, however, is an ecological
tool; it involves competition. In Kohonen (1995), despite uniform input, self-
organising networks of cells are in lateral competition. In Best (1997), unlike the
predator/prey relationship, competing populations tend to avoid each other
which, according to Pianka (1981), becomes a source of diversity and
exploration. If that is the case then David Bohm’s “mind of the matter” as a tool
of synthesis between Darwinian selection and adaptation would certainly make
sense.
Behaviourist Works on Organisational Learning 
A multi-disciplinary approach is common to most evolutionary workers. Some,
despite their multi-faceted thinking, have produced a set of works which can be
classified as behaviourist. The co-operation of Simon, Levinthal, March, and
Cyert in MIT over many years resulted in a fruitful combination of  economics
and management science in an evolutionary framework. Operationalisation of
Baldwin’s biology by Hinton and Nowlan in a learning context, propelled
application of evolutionary learning by these thinkers and their close followers to
social sciences. Competition, economic cycles, psychology of economic agents,
and efficiency, mingle imperceptibly with history-dependent decision making,
bottom-up management etc. Most evolutionary learning follows in their path.
Despite innovation and interesting applications, the followers’ method of
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mimetic imitation can itself be a case in evolutionary research. When detached
from the biological and A-Life sources of learning, imitation of behavourists by
behaviourists can reproduce the evolutionary dilemma of exploitation versus
exploration. 16
Simon (1990), and Levinthal and March (1981), took up the idea of genes as
routines and focused their learning theories on these mundane procedures,
rather than the grandeur of top management declarations. They expressed
efficiency in terms of sticking to procedures especially in lean times; but they
also showed the limits of exploiting the successful traits for the long term, which
necessitates exploration suitable in slack times. This basic view of learning types
has had wide following which has produced several parallel learning types, such
as fermentation and convergence, convergence and reorientation, mimetic
learning and so on. These studies show the limits of learning and what they can
achieve. The compromise is a reflection of the general selection-adaptation
discussion outlined above. Adaptation is obviously preferred to selection by all
these writers; companies are never lined up in a death row. While the followers
demonstrate clear preference, the founders of behaviourist evolutionary thought
tend to be more cautious. The economic cycles are the decisive environment and
managers adapt to these waves through a complex web of feedback and
responses.
Institutions as a Means of Adaptation
Self-organisation is an active and interactive way of seeking adaptation. With
institutions adaptation is exogenous. A decision by governments for instance to
support a certain technology imposes adaptation. As the turbojet engine began
to dominate the aeronautical market, ships and off-shore oil industries also had
to adapt to this kind of engine (Constant, 1987).
Competition-avoidance and adaptivity by institutions might be behind the
survival of many financial institutions in crisis-ridden Asia or identical banks in
the UK. 
Contribution of Artificial-Life to Learning
More recently, similar debates on learning have resumed in A-Life studies
showing what learning can achieve and yet still create problems. The discussions
began with  Hinton and Nowlan’s view that learning can enhance and speed up
evolution. This argument, based on Baldwin, has been developed further by
Holland (1992) through his classifier systems, and has witnessed considerable
advances by Wilson (1995, 1997) and Japanese researchers, led by Takadama et
al (1997). In this arena too, the ecologist influence has manifested itself through
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costs and efficiency. The debate is not about the R&D costs, or even the
opportunity cost of learning, it is about losing diversity and complexity because
of learning. Mayley (1996, 1997) attributes the phenomenon to the phenotypic-
genotypal dichotomy caused by universal learning. Work in A-Life, however, is
not all ecological. Work on co-evolution and communication is quite prevalent.
At the moment, research in A-Life shows considerable loyalty to the frames of
thought generated by biology and complexity. It would be surprising if future
research in A-Life did not gravitate to adaptive learning at the expense of
ecology.
- 36 -
References
Abbott, A. (1990) The System of the Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert
Labour, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Abu-Mostafa, Yaser S, ‘A Method for Learning from Hints’ in Advances in
Neural Information Process (1993) 
Ahouse, J. et al, ‘Reality Kisses the Neck of Speculation: A Report From The
NKC Workgroup’ in Stein D. (Ed) (1991) Lectures in Complex Systems,
Redwood, CA: Addison-Wesley, pp331-352.
Aizawa, A. ‘Fitness, Landscape Characterisation by Variance of Decompositions’,
National Center For Science Information System, 1998, 3-29-1 Otsuka, Bunkyo-
Ku, Tokyo 112, Japan.
Aldrich, H.E., (1979) Organisations And Environment, Engelwood Cliffs, N.J:
Prentice Hall.
Aldrich, H.E. et al, ‘Social Behaviour and Entrepreneurial Net-works’. Paper
presented at the Babson Conference on Entrepreneurship Research, Boston, 1986.
Aldrich, H.E. and Pfeffer, J., ’Environments of Organisations’, in Alex, I. (Ed)
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol 11, 1976, pp79-105.
Amburguey, et al, ‘Disruptive Selection and Population Segmentation:
Interpopulation Competition as a Segregation Process’ in J.A.C. Baum and J.V.
Singh (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New York: Oxford
University Press, pp240-245.
Amburguey, T.L. and Hayagreva, R., ‘Organisational Ecology: Past Present and
Future Directions’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 39, 1996, pp1265-
1288.
Anderson, R., ‘Learning and Evolution: a Quantitative Genetic Approach’,
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 175, 1995, pp89-101. 
Anderson, P.W., Arrow, K.J. and Pines, D. (1988) The Economy as a Complex
Evolving System, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, California.
Astley, G.W. and Van De Ven, A., ‘Central Perspectives and Debates in
Organisation Theory’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 1983, pp245-273.
- 37 -
Audretsch D.B. and Mahmood T. (1993) ‘Empty Growth and Survival: New
Learning on Firm Selection and Industry Evolution’, Empirica, Vol 20, PT 1,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp25-33.
Bahk, B-H, and Gort, M. ‘Decomposing Learning by Doing in New Plants’
Journal of Political Economy, 1993, Vol i01, No 4.
Baldwin, J.M., ‘A New Factor In Evolution’, American Naturalist, 30, 1996,
pp441-451, 536-553.
Barnett, W.P., ‘The Liability of Collective Action: Growth and Change Among
Early American Telephone Companies’, in Baum J.A.C. and Singh J.V. (Eds)
Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations (1994) New York: Oxford University
Press, pp3-20.
Barnett, W.P. and Hansen M.T., ‘The Red Queen in Organisational Evolution’,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol 17, 1996, pp139-157.
Barnett, W. P. and Amburguey, ‘The Organisational Ecology of a Technological
System’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 1990, pp31-60.
Baum, J.A.C. and Oliver, C., ‘Institutional Linkages and Organisational
Mortality’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 1991, pp187-218.
Baum, J.A.C. and Oliver, C., ‘Institutional Embeddedness and the Dynamics of
Organisational Populations’, American Sociological Review, 57, 1992, pp540-549.
Baum, J.A.C. and Powell, W.A., ‘Cultivating an Institutional Ecology of
Organisations: Comment on Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, and Torres’, American
Sociological Review, 60, 1995, pp529-538.
Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V., ‘Organisation-Environment Co-evolution’ in
Baum J.A.C. and Singh J.V. (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of
Organisations, New York: Oxford University Press, pp3-20.
Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V., ‘Organisational Hierarchies and Evolutionary
Processes: Some Reflections on a Theory of Organisational Evolution’ in Baum
J.A.C. and Singh J.V. (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New
York: Oxford University Press, pp3-20.
Beinhocker, E., ‘On the Origin of Strategies’, The McKinsey Quarterly, 1999, 4,
pp46-57.
Belew, R.K., ‘Evolution, Learning, and Culture: Computational Metaphors for
Adaptive Algorithms’, Complex Systems, 1990, 4, pp11-49.
- 38 -
Berninghaus S.V. and Schwalbe U. ‘Evolution Interaction and Nash quilibria’
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, Vol. 29, 1996, pp57-85.
Best, M., ‘Models for Interacting Populations for Memes: Competition and
Niche Behaviour’, Media Library, MIT, 1997, 9 pages.
Binmore K. and Samuelson L., ‘Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection’,
Journal of Economic Literature, May 31, 1996, Classification number C70, C72.
Bohm P. (2002) Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge.
Bonabeau, E. and Meyer, C. ‘Swarm intelligence: A whole new way to think
about business’, Harvard Business Review, 2001, 79(5), pp106-114.
Bonabeau, E., Dorigo, M. and Theraulaz, G. (1999) Swarm Intelligence: from
natural to artificial systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boyd, J.H. and Smith, B.D., The Co-evolution of the Real and Financial Sectors
in the Growth Process’, World Bank Economic Review, May, 1996, 10(2), pp371-
96.
Britain, J., ‘Density - Independent Selection and Community Evolution’ in
Baum J.A.C. and Singh J.V. (Eds) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations (1994)
New York: Oxford University Press, pp3-20.
Bruderer, E. ‘How Strategies are Learned’. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1993.
Bruderer, E. and Singh J.V., ‘Organisational Evolution, Learning, and Selection:
A Genetic-Algorithm-Based Model’, Academy of Management Journal, 1996, Vol
39, No 5, pp1322(28).
Bureth, A., Wolff, S. and Zanfei, A., ‘The two faces of learning by co-operation:
the evolution and stability of inter-firm agreements in the European electronics
industry’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 1997, Vol 32, pp519-
537.
Burgelman, R.A. (1991a) ’Strategy-Making and Organisational Ecology: A
Conceptual Integration’, in J.V Singh (Ed) (1990) Organisational Evolution:
New Directions, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Burgelman, R. A. (1991b) ‘Intraorganisational Ecology of Strategy-Making and
Organisational Adaptation: Theory and Field Research’, Organisation Science, 2,
pp239-262.
- 39 -
Carroll, G.R. (1988) Ecological Models of Organisations, Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger.
Carroll, G.R. and Hannan, M.T., ‘On Using Institutional Theory in Studying
Organisational Populations: Reply to Zucker, American Sociological Review,
1989, 54, pp545-548.
Cohen, M. D., ‘The Power of Parallel Thinking’, Journal of Economic Behaviour
and Organisation, 1981, 2, pp285-306.
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P,. ‘A Garbage Can Model of
Organisational Choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972, 17, pp1-25.
Cohen, M.D. and Bacdayan, P., ‘Organisational Routines are Stored as
Procedural Memory: Evidence from Laboratory Study’, Organisation Science,
1994, 5, pp554-568.
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A., ‘Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on
Learning and Innovation’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 1990, 35, pp128-
152.
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm,
Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Darwin, C. (1859) The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, reprinted
(1985), London: Penguin Books.
Davis, L. (Ed). (1991) Handbook of Genetic Algorithms, New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold.
Day, R.H. and Chen P. (1993) Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics,
Oxford University Press.
Delacroix, J. and Carroll, G.R., ‘Organisational Founding: An Ecological Study
of the Newspaper Industries in Argentina and Ireland’, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 1983, 28, pp274-291.
Delacroix, J. and Hayagreeva, R., ‘Externalities and Ecological Theory:
Unbundling Density Dependence’ in Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V. (1994)
Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New York: Oxford University Press.
Delacroix, J. and Rao, H., ‘Externalities and Ecological Theory: Unbundling
Density Dependence’ in Baum J.A.C. and Singh J.V. (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary
Dynamics of Organisations, New York: Oxford University Press, pp255-268.
- 40 -
De-Vany A., ‘Information, Chance, and Evolution: Alchian and the Economics
of Self-Organisation’, Economic Inquiry, 1996, Vol 34, PT 3, pp427-443.
Di Paolo Ezequiel A. ‘Social Co-ordination and Spatial Organisation: Steps
towards the evolution of communication’, School of Cognitive and Computing
Sciences, University of Sussex.
Dietrich (1996) in Groenwegen, J. (Ed) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond,
GRASP/Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Dimaggio, P. J., and Powell, W.W., ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality’ in Organisational Fields, American
Sociological Review, 1983, 48, pp147-160.
Dosi, G. et al, ‘Learning, Market Selection, and the Evolution of Industrial
Structures’, Small Business Economics, 1995, Vol 7, pp411-436.
Doz Y.L., ‘The Evolution of Cooperation in Strategic Alliances: Initial
Conditions or Learning Processes?’, Strategic Management Journal, 1996, Vol 17,
pp55-83.
Easterby-Smith, M., ‘Disciplines of Organisational Learning: Contributions and
Critiques’, Human Relations, 1997, Vol 50 (9), pp1085-1113.
ECAL papers (1997) Fourth European Conference on Artificial Life.
Edwards,R. (1979) Contested Terrain: Transformation of the Workplace in the
Twentieth Century, New York, Basic Books.
Fleming, L. and Sorenson, O., ‘Technology as a complex adaptive system:
evidence from patent data’, Research Policy, 2001, 30:1019-1039.
Freeman, J.H. and Lomi, A., ‘Resource Partitioning and Foundings of Banking
Cooperatives in Italy’ in Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V. (1994c) Evolutionary
Dynamics of Organisations, New York: Oxford University Press.
Freeman, J.H. and Hannan, M.T., ‘Niche Width and the Dynamics of
Organisational Populations’, American Journal of Sociology, 1984, 88 pp116-145.
Gale. Douglas, ‘What have we learned from social learning?’ European Economic
Review, 1996, 40, pp617-628.
Granovetter, M.. ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology, 1985, 91: 481-510.
- 41 -
Groenwegen, J. (Ed) (1996) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, GRASP/
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J.H., ‘The Population Ecology of Organisations’,
American Journal of Sociology, 1977, 82, pp929-964.
Hannan, M.T. and Carroll, G.R. (1992) Dynamics of Organisational Populations:
Density, Competition, and Legitimation, New York: Oxford University Press.
Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J.H. (1989) Organisational Ecology, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J.H., ’Structural Inertia and Organisational
Change’, American Sociological Review, 1984, 49, pp149-164.
Hannan, M.T. and Carroll, G.R., ‘Theory Building and Cheap Talk About
Legitimation: Reply to Baum and Powell’, American Sociological Review, 1995,
60, pp539-544.
Harley, ‘Learning the Evolutionary Stable Strategy’, Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 1981, Vol 89, pp.611-633.
Hinton, G.E. and Nowlan, S.J., ‘How Learning Can Guide Evolution’, Complex
Systems, 1987, 1: 495-502.
Holland, J.H. (1992) Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, 2nd ed,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Huber, G., ‘Organisational Learning,: The Contributing Processes and the
Literature’, Organisational Science, 1991, 2(1), pp88-115.
Gavetti, G. and Levinthal, D., ‘Looking Forward and Looking Backward:
Cognitive and Experiential Search, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2000, 45,
pp113-137.
Kauffman, S.A., ‘The Evolution of Economic Webs’ in Anderson, P.W., Arrow,
K.J. and Pines, D. (1988) The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, Addison-
Wesley, Redwood City, California.
Kauffman, S.A. and Oliva, T. (1995) At Home in the Universe: The Search for
Kaws of Self-Organisation and Complexity, New York, Oxford University Press.
Kauffman, S.A. and Levin, S., ‘Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Walks on
Rugged Landscapes’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1987, 128: 11-45.
- 42 -
Kelly, D. and Amburguey, T.L., ‘Organisational Inertia and Momentum: a
Dynamic Model of Strategic Change’, Academy of Management Journal, 1991,
34, pp591-612.
Kennedy, J., Eberhart, R. and Shi, Y. (2001) Swarm Intelligence, San Mateo,
California: Morgan Kauffman.
Kitts, B., Edvinsson, L. and Beding, T., ‘Intellectual Capital: from intangible
assets to fitness landscapes’, Expert Systems with Applications, 2001, 20, pp35-40.
Kogut, B., ‘Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’, Strategic
Management Journal, 1988, 9, pp319-332.
Kohonen, T. (1995) Self-Organising Maps, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Koput, K.W., ‘A Chaotic Model of Innovative Search: Some Answers, Many
Questions’, Organisation Science, 1997, Vol 8, No 5, pp528-542.
Krugman, P. (1996) The Self-Organising Economy, Oxford, Basil, Blackwell.
Lähdesmäki, T. (1998) Co-Evolution - Growing Together, Lohja, Feb.
Lant, T.K., ‘Aspiration Level Adaptation: An Empirical Exploration’,
Management Science, 1989, 33 (5), pp623-644. 
Lant, T.K., ‘Aspiration Level Adaptation: An Empirical Exploration’,
Management Science, 1992, 38, pp623-644.
Lant, T.K. and Mezias, S.J., ‘Managing Discontinuous Change: A Simulation
Study of Organisational Learning and Entrepreneurship’, Strategic Management
Journal, 1990, 11, pp147-179.
Lant, T.K. and Mezias, S.J., ‘An Organisational Learning Model of Convergence
and Reorientation’, Organisation Science, 1992, 3, pp47-71.
Levinthal, D.A., ‘Organisational Adaptation and Environmental Selection-
Interrelated Processes of Change’, Organisation Science, 1991, 2: 140-145.
Levinthal, D., ‘Random Walks and Organisational Mortality’, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 1991b, 36, pp397-420.
Levinthal, D.A. (1994) Adaptation in Rugged Landscapes, Working Paper,
Wharton School, University Of Pennsylvania.
- 43 -
Levinthal, D.A. and March, J.G., ‘A Model of Adaptive Organisational Search’,
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 1981, 2: 307-333.
Lounamaa, P.H. and March, J.G., ‘Adaptive Coordination of a Learning Team’,
Management Science, 1987, 33, pp107-123.
Low, B.S. and Simon, C.P., ‘The Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations’, The
Academy of Management Review, 1995, Vol 20, Issue (3), pp735-740.
Lumsden, C.J. and Singh, J.V., ‘The Dynamics of Organisational Speciation in
Singh J.V. (Ed) (1990) Organisational Evolution: New Directions, Newbury Park,
CA: Sage, pp145-163..
Makadok, R. and Walker, G., ‘Search and Selection in the Money Market Fund
Industry’, Strategic Management Journal, 1996, Vol 17, special issue, pp39-54.
March, J.G., ‘Footnotes to Organisational Change’, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 1981, 26: 563-577.
March, J.G., ‘Variable Risk Preferences and Adaptive Aspirations’, Journal of
Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 1988, 9, pp5-24.
March, J.G., ‘Exploration and Exploitation in Organisational Learning’,
Organisation Science, 1991, 2: 71-87.
March, J.G.. ‘The Evolution of Evolution’ in Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V. (Eds)
(1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New York: Oxford University
Press, pp39-49.
Mayley, G., ‘Landscapes. Learning Costs and Genetic Assimilation. Evolution,
Learning and Instinct: 199 Years of Baldwin Effects’, Evolutionary Computation
(special issue), 1996, Vol 4 (3), pp213-234. 
Mayley, G., ‘Guiding or Hiding: Exploration into the Effects of Learning on the
Rate of Evolution’, Fourth European Conference on Artificial Life, ECAL, (1997).
Maynard Smith, J., ‘When Learning Guides Evolution’, Nature, 1987. 329,
pp761-762.
McCarthy, I. and Tan, Y.K., ‘Manufacturing competitiveness and fitness
landscape theory’, Journal of Materials Processing Technology, 2000, 107, pp347-
352.
McKelvey, B. (1982) Organisational Systematics: Taxonomy, Evolution,
Classification, Berkeley, CA: University Of California Press.
- 44 -
McKelvey, B. and Aldrich, H.E., ‘Populations, Natural Selection, and Applied
Organisational Science’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 1983, Vol 28, pp101-
28.
McPherson, M.J., ‘Evolution in Communities of Voluntary Organisations’ in
Singh, J.V. (Ed) (1990) Organisational Evolution: New Directions, Newbury Park,
CA: Sage, pp224-245.
Mezias, S.J. and Glynn, M.A., ‘The Three Faces of Corporate Renewal:
Institution, Revolution, and Evolution’, Strategic Management Journal, 1993, 14,
pp77-101.
Mezias, S.J. and Lant, T.K., ‘Mimetic Learning and the Evolution of
Organisational Populations’ in Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V. (Eds) (1994)
Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New York: Oxford University Press,
pp3-22.
Miller, D., ‘A Preliminary Typology of Organisational Learning: Synthesising the
Literature’, Journal of Management, 1996, Vol 22, No 3, pp485-505.
Mirowski, P., ‘Do You Know the Way to Santa Fe? Or Political Economy gets
too Complex’ in Pressman, S. (Ed) (1996) Intersections in Political Economy,
Malvern after Ten Years, Routledge. 
Morecroft, J.D., ‘Rationality in the Analysis of Behavioral Simulation Models’,
Management Science, 1985, 31, pp900-916.
Morgan, C.L., ‘On Modification and Variation’, Science, 1896, 4, pp733-740.
Moss Scott., ‘Equilibrium, Evolution and Learning’, Journal of Economic
Behaviour and Organisation, 1990, Vol 13, PT, 1, pp97-115.
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change, Cambridge, MA: Beiknap Press.
Nooteboom in Groenwegen, J. (Ed) (1996) Transaction Cost Economics and
Beyond, GRASP/Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston.
Ohmae, K., ‘The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances’, Harvard Business Review,
1989, 67(2) pp143-154.
Pianka, E.A., ‘Competition and Niche Theory’ in May, R.M. (Ed) (1981),
Theoretical Ecology Principles and Applications, Oxford: Blackwell Scientific
Publications.
- 45 -
Pitelis, in Groenwegen, J. (Ed) (1996) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond,
GRASP/Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Porac, J., ‘On the Concept of “Organisational Community”’ in Baum, J.A.C.
and Singh, J.V. (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New York:
Oxford University Press, pp3-20.
Porter, M. (1980) Competitive Strategy : techniques for analyzing industries and
competitors, New York, The Free Press.
Porter, M. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior
Performance, New York: The Free Press.
Quinn, J.B., ‘Managing Innovation: Controlled Chaos’, Harvard Business
Review, 1985, May-June, pp73-84.
Rao, H., ‘The Social Construction of Reputation: Contests, Credentialing and
Legitimation in the American Automobile Industry, 1895~1912’, Strategic
Management Journal, 1994, 15, pp29-44.
Rao, H. and Neilsen, E.H., ‘An Ecology of Collectivized Agency: Dissolutions of
Savings and Loan Associations, 1960-1987’, Administrative Science Quarterly,
1992, 37, pp448-470.
Rivkin, J., ‘Imitation of Complex Strategies’, Management Science, 2000, 46(6)
pp824-844.
Rivkin, J., ‘Reproducing Knowledge: Replication without imitation at moderate
complexity’, Organisation Science, 2001, 12(3) pp274-293.
Robson, A.J., ‘The Evolution of Strategic Behaviour’, Canadian Journal of
Economics, 1995, Vol 28, No 1, pp17- 41.
Romme, G. and Dillen, R., ‘Mapping the Landscape of Organisational
Learning’, European Management Journal, 1997, Vol 15, No 1, pp68-78.
Rosenkopf, L. and Tushman, M.L., ‘The Co-evolution of Technology and
Organisation’ in Baum, J.A.C. and Singh, J.V. (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary
Dynamics of Organisations, New B. York: Oxford University Press, pp403-424.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934) The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Scott, W.R. (1987) Organisations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 2nd Ed,
Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 46 -
Senge, P.M. (1990) The Fifth Discipline, Doubleday Currency, New York.
Seth, A. (1997) Interaction, Uncertainty, and the Evolution of Complexity, Centre
for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics, Innovation Centre, University of
Sussex, Brighton.
Shrivastava, P., ‘A typology of Organisational Learning Systems’, Journal of
Management Studies, 1983, Vol 20 (1) pp7-28.
Simon, H.A., ‘A Mechanism For Social Selection and Successful Altruism’,
Science, 1990, 250, pp1665-1668.
Singh, J.V., ‘Performance, Slack, and Risk Taking in Organisational Decision
Making’, Academy Of Management Journal, 1986, 29, pp562-585.
Singh, J.V. (Ed) (1990) Organisational Evolution: New Directions, Newbury Park,
CA: Sage, pp145-163.
Singh, J.V. and Lumsden, C.J., ‘Theory and Research in Organisational Ecology’
in Scott, W.R. and Blake, J. (Eds) Annual Review of Sociology, 1990, Vol 16, Palo
Alto, CA:Annual Reviews, pp161-195. 
Singh, J.V., Tucker, D.J. and Meinhard, A.G., ‘Are Voluntary Social Service
Organisations Structurally Inert? Exploring an Assumption in Organisational
Ecology’. Paper presented at The Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management,
Anaheim, CA, 1988.
Singh, J.V. et al, ‘Organisational Change and Organisational Mortality’,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1986, 31, pp587-611.
Strickberger, M. (1996) Evolution, 2nd ed, Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and
Bartlett.
Swaminthan, Academy of Management Journal, 1994, Vol 39, No 5.
Takadama et al, ‘Learning Model, for Organisational Learning in Coexistent
Sub-Groups of Swarm Robots’, ECAL97 (1997), Papers, pp1-10.
Teece, D.J., ‘Firm Organisation, Industrial Structure and Technological
Innovation’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 1996, Vol 31,
pp193-224.
Tisdell, C. (1996) Bounded Rationality and Economic Evolution, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK.
- 47 -
Turney, P., ‘Myth and Legends of Baldwin Effect’ in Fogarti, T. and Venturini,
G. (Eds) (1996) Proceedings of the ICML-96 (13th International Conference on
Machine Learning), Bari, Italy, pp135-142.
Tushman, M.L. and Romanelli, E., ‘Organisational Evolution: A Metamorphosis
Model of Convergence and Reorientation’ in Cummings, L.L. and Staw, B.M.
(Eds) Research in Organisational Behaviour, 1985, Vol 7, Greenwich, CA: JAI
Press, pp171-222.
Usher, J.M. and Evans, M.J., ‘The Life And Death Along Gasoline Alley:
Darwinian and Lamarkian Processes in a Differentiating Population’, Academy of
Management Journal, 1996, Vol 39, No 5, pp1428- 66. 
Utterback, J. and Abernathy, W.J., ‘A Dynamic Model of Process and Product
Innovation’, Omega, 1975, 3, pp639-656.
Van De Ven, A.H. and Grazman, D.N. (1994) From Generation to Generation: A
Genealogy of Twin Cities Health Care Organisations, 1853-1993, Working Paper,
Strategic Management Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
Van De Ven, A. and Garud, R., ‘The Co-evolution of Technical and
Institutional Events in the Development of an Innovation’ in Baum, J.A.C. and
Singh J.V. (Eds) (1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organisations, New York:
Oxford University Press, pp425-443.
Van De Ven, A. and Polley, D., ‘Learning While Innovating’, Organisation
Science, 1992, 3, pp92-116.
Warglen, M., ‘Hierarchical Selection and Organisational Adaptation’, Industrial
and Corporate Change, 1995, Vol 4, No 1, pp161-186.
Weibull Jorgen W. (1998) What Have We Learned from Evolutionary Game
Theory So Far?, Stockholm School of Economics and IUI.
Weick, K. (1979) The Social Psychology of Organising, 2nd ed, New York:
Random House.
White M.C., Marin, D.B., Brazeal, D.V. and Friedman, W.H., ‘The Evolution
of Organisations: Suggestions from Complexity Theory about the Interplay
Between Natural Selection and Adaptation’, Human Relations, 1997, Vol 50,
(11) 1997, pp1383-1401.
Wilson, S.W. ‘Generalisation in Evolutionary Learning’, Conference paper,
ECAL, July, 1997.
- 48 -
Winter, S.G., ‘Survival, Selection, and Inheritance in Evolutionary Theories of
Organisation’ in Singh, J.V. (Ed) (1990) Organisational Evolution: New
Directions, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp269-297.
Wright, S., ‘The Roles of Mutation, Inbreeding, Crossbreeding and Selection in
Evolution’, Proceedings of The 11th International Congress of Genetics, 1932, 1,
pp356-366.
Zucker, L.G., ‘Combining Institutional Theory and Population Ecology: No
Legitimacy, No History’, American Sociological Review, 1989, 54, pp542-545. 
- 49 -
End Notes
1. For a wider view of synthesis of debates in organisational change
involving six pairs of debate see Astley and Van de Ven 1983.
2. Mental models are defined by Foster and Kaplan (2001) as “the core
concepts of the corporation, the beliefs and assumptions, the cause-and-
effect relationships, the guidelines for interpreting language and signals,
the stories repeated within the corporate walls” (pp44-45).
3. Staff may compete to be assigned to specific projects and projects may
compete within the firm for skilled staff.
4. These are defined by Nelson and Winter (1982) as “…characteristics of
firms that range from well-specified technical routines for producing
things, through procedures for hiring and firing, ordering new inventory,
or stepping up production of items in high demand, to policies
regarding investment, research and development (R&D), or advertising,
and business strategies about product diversification and overseas
investment”.(p14). 
5. The control system within an organisation can serve to determine the
degree of internal variation generated, the resource allocation system can
be viewed as a selector (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996).
6. Nelson and Winter (1982) define routines as “…characteristics of firms
that range from well-specified technical routines for producing things,
through procedures for hiring and firing, ordering new inventory, or
stepping up production of items in high demand, to policies regarding
investment, research and development (R&D), or advertising, and
business strategies about product diversification and overseas
investment”. (p14)
7. Levitt and March (1988). for competency trap see Levinthal and March
(1981).
8. Most authors on complexity theories do not distinguish between these
and simply refer to ‘metaphors’. This convention is adopted in this
working paper.
9. Boyd and Smith (1996). Elcoteq, a Nordic electronics company, has
welcomed co-evolution with a statement (Lähdesmäki, 1998). It has also
opened a niche in A-Life Research. 
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10. Cyert and March (1963); Levitt and March (1988) for Random
Learning which does not yield to rational planners.
11. See also Harley (1981).
12. For a chaotic model of innovative search with feedback see Koput
(1997).
13. Alleles, also called allelomorphs, are any one of two or more genes that
may occur alternatively at a given site (locus) on a chromosome.
14. Most generally epistasis exists when the effect of two or more non-allelic
genes in combination is not the sum of their separate effects. Larousse,
Dictionary of Science and Technology (1995).
15. For a comprehensive study of routines see also Cohen and Bacdayan
(1994). 
16. The use of Markstrat complex games consisting of top management roles
by a follower, even if played by rank and file, may still weaken the
rhetoric of ignoring the top management.
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